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Political and academic analyses of Trump’s election victory, like the analysis of the results in the
Brexit referendum, has initially largely focused on the role of class, race, gender, and to some
extent region.  For weeks, we have taken the task to “explain Trump” to be the task to explain why
so many people voted for him.
Asking that question leads us to the analysis of different demographic groups, their interests and
their ideologies and an analysis of the capacity (or not) of different candidates and parties to
appeal to them. Asking that question has also been an occasion for different parts of the left to
blame other parts of the left. That analysis has its place but it neglects the failures of the political
system preceding both Trump’s victory and the Brexit vote and it risks missing what is at stake in
terms of the possibility of fundamental institutional changes, which would affect all social groups,
though certainly not all groups equally.
My colleague Michael McQuarrie has recently argued that sociology “has a Trump problem”: He
argued that we need to take sociologists’ failure to understand and predict the working class vote
for Trump seriously as a result of deep-seated intellectual dispositions. But that may have been
sociology’s Trump problem before the election. Since the election, a different kind of Trump
problem has become apparent: Sociology, like most social sciences tends to default to thinking in
terms of individuals, groups, and ideologies rather than taking institutions seriously. To the extent
that sociologists have thought about institutions they have tended to assume a very stable political
context. We sociologists have not practiced our vocabulary for the real range of variation in
political systems and the real range of possible political outcomes for some time. Any analysis that
does not consider the full range of outcomes risks minimizing what is at stake in current events.
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We might expect sociologists of stratification to analyse individuals and groups and we might
expect sociologists of education, of medicine, and of science to examine changes in policy while
assuming the form of the political system as stable. But political sociologists have not been
immune to a version of this problem: Political sociologists, particularly in the US but also
elsewhere, have developed a very sophisticated language for asking “who wins”, that is, “which
social movement or political grouping, with what strategy can influence policy”, taking the
parameters of the contest largely for granted.
Work that identifies more self-consciously as “critical” has focused on critiquing existing institutions
with diagnosis that might strike later observers as both too alarmist and not alarmist enough given
what may now unfold. This work has also tended to assume the stability of institutions, even while
ritualistically declaring them full of contradictions and inherently prone to crisis. Yes, critical work
has also been a place for imagining alternative orders, but the fact that these were only positive
alternatives set against “reproduction” as the main danger betrays a debt to an idea of progress
that previous generations of critical theorists had buried in the light of bitter historical experiences
of war, violence and mass displacement.
There are complex reasons for this assumption of stability, some of them pragmatic and
psychological, some of them deeply intellectual. Sociology and political science has a tendency to
treat events, including wars and regime changes, as “external” disruptions to what it considers its
“real” object of study. It has not helped that social science research has privileged not only the
West but also more particularly the UK and US, both of which are exceptional in their formal
political stability when viewed from the centre of their empires.
Both Brexit and Trump were preceded by a significant weakening of liberal democratic institutions,
most notably the newsmedia and political parties on both sides of the political spectrum. Related
to the weakening of political parties, we can observe a difficulty in recruiting and retaining a
political class that functions on terms other than its own.
In the UK, the result of the Brexit vote – a plebiscite in a country that has no constitutional role for
or regulation of plebiscites – has to be explained as much by a divided conservative party and the
reckless leadership of David Cameron as by the views of people who voted in favour of “leave”.
Whatever we think of Jeremy Corbyn as a party leader, the process surrounding his initial
leadership bid has revealed that “New Labour”, sociologically speaking, refers to a clique rather
than to a specific set of ideas, and it has revealed the damage this clique has done to
communication within and recruitment to the Labour Party.
Of course, we must analyse the long-term failures of the Democratic Party in the United States as
Josh Pacewicz, for example, has begun to do based on his research. But liberals and leftist across
the world are now realising how much they have also depended on a functioning Republican Party
in the US.
Pollsters have pointed out, that, demographically speaking, the UK and the US are the same
country before and after a narrow referendum or vote. We can analyse cultural structures to
highlight continuities of racism, nationalism, and sexism. But in both cases, electoral defeat,
however narrow, may have profound consequences. It has fundamentally strengthened the hand
of some players who are not defined primarily by their ideological content but stand out by their
willingness to exploit the weakness of institutions for their own advantage regardless of the
consequences. In both cases the institutional antecedents of the event do not bode well for the
ability of larger groups of elites to mitigate ill-effects even in their own self-interest.
Some of our tools for observing political processes might make us slow to intellectually
acknowledge the fact that regime change is a possibility. While some analysts look to the next
election based on polling data and approval ratings, many people already feel like they live in a
distinctively new period of history: This past July, about three weeks after the Brexit vote in the UK,
the writer Ian McEwan highlighted that the experience of reading newspapers and talking politics
had fundamentally changed. He likened the public to “Kremlinologists” who were reduced to
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gossiping “below the stairs” about what a small clique of people might “really” be thinking and
planning to do.  This gossip is a symptom of the concentration of power in very few hands. In the
UK, we are still watching below the stairs five months later, effectively without an opposition in
parliament, with little control of a small group of leaders from within their own party, and with
widely-read newspapers engaged in a campaign that includes targeting individuals members of
the judiciary; in the US many have already averted their eyes after one month of a similar but
more clearly stage-managed show.
History reminds us of the greater range of outcomes in terms of political forms.  The comparison to
the 1930s does point to similarities in terms of a turn away from trade and in terms of the
prevalence of racist ideologies. But the alternatives for countries like the US and the UK are not
“Hitler” or “Fascism” versus “just another lost election”, especially when we consider a relative lack
of organization on the right on the one hand and the distinctive problems of the current economic
model, current communication technologies, a shift of power away from the west and
environmental degradation on the other hand.
Will liberal democratic institutions assert themselves, either through inertia, as they have in some
previous crisis, or through some project of active organising within and across and outside political
parties? It is too early to tell. The US and the UK are different countries, and observers might
disagree on the prospects for each. I have in the above perhaps rather exaggerated the
similarities between the crises, which the two countries are facing. Worryingly of course, though
distinctive countries and cases, they are not independent of each other. War on a larger scale than
we are already seeing could engulf both, for example.
Sociologists and political scientists have a vocabulary for analysing different types of authoritarian
regimes and different types of state failure that we might now have to undust to examine the forms
of political power that are emerging more closely. Richard Lachmann has raised the possibility of a
“Bonapartist” Trump, for example, who might try to use a combination of vigilantes, and police
power to silence opponents, which “could mean that the U.S. will not have a fair, contested
election for the foreseeable future.” We also need to further develop our language for the political
forms among and within and between states that emerge as part of the systemic aspects of
current developments.
